APEC Principles of Interconnection
In the spirit of the commitments made by many APEC economies to the Reference Paper attached to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Basic Telecommunications Agreement, APEC WTO members and other interested member economies offer this statement of APEC Principles of Interconnection, with each economy voluntarily indicating expected time frames for implementation of each principle. The principles are not meant to replace or exceed commitments made by APEC WTO member economies under the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications and the related Reference Paper.
Interconnection in this set of Principles refers to linking with all suppliers providing public telecommunications transport networks or services in order to establish effective any-to-any connectivity and to allow the users of one supplier to communicate with users of another supplier and to access services provided by another supplier.
A major supplier is a supplier which has the ability to materially affect the terms of participation (having regard to price and supply) in the relevant market for basic telecommunications service as a result of: (a) control over essential facilities; (b) or use of its position in the market.
At the time of the Fourth APEC Ministerial for Telecommunications and Information, ten member economies offered information on the timeframe for the implementation of these principles in their economies: Australia; Canada; Hong Kong; China; Indonesia; Japan; New Zealand; Phillippines; Singapore; Chinese Taipei; USA.
Principles:
1. A major supplier has an obligation to provide interconnection at any technically feasible point in the network.
2. A major supplier has an obligation to provide interconnection under non-discriminatory and transparent terms, conditions, including technical standards and specifications.
3. A major supplier has an obligation to provide interconnection at non-discriminatory rates and of a quality no less favorable than that provided for its own like services or for like services of non-affiliated service suppliers or for its subsidiaries or other affiliates.
4. A major supplier has an obligation to provide interconnection in a timely fashion and to negotiate in good faith. The regulatory regime has dispute resolution mechanisms, which may include the application of general or sector specific competition law and associated penalties, if the major supplier delays in fulfilling its obligations.
5. A major supplier has an obligation to provide interconnection at cost-oriented rates.
5.1 The regulatory regime has processes to increase the transparency of these cost-oriented rates.
5.2 The reasonableness and the economic feasibility of the cost-oriented rates are enabled through costing methodologies or other mechanisms through broad consultation of interested parties.
5.3 A major supplier has an obligation to provide interconnection in a manner sufficiently unbundled so that another supplier need not pay for network components or facilities that it does not require for the service to be provided.
5.3.1. The essential ability of competing service operators to enter all segments of the market requires identifying critical, technically and economically feasible points of interconnection to the major supplier's network.5.3.2. The regulatory regime requires provision of access, often from major suppliers, to key rights of way, such as poles, ducts and conduits, under reasonable terms and conditions in order to access unbundled elements.
5.4. A major supplier has an obligation to provide interconnection upon request, at points in addition to the network termination points offered to the majority of other interconnecting suppliers, subject to charges that reflect the justifiable costs associated with necessary additional facilities.
6. A major supplier is prevented from anti-competitive practices, such as engaging in anti-competitive cross-subsidization and anti-competitive subsidization from other suppliers.
6.1 A major supplier is prevented from anti-competitive practices such as abusing information obtained from competitors.
6.2. A major supplier is prevented from anti-competitive practices such as not making available to other services suppliers on a timely basis technical information about essential facilities and commercially relevant information which are necessary for them to provide services.
7. It is ensured that either interconnection agreements between a major supplier and other operators or a reference interconnection offer will be made publicly available.
7.1 . All procedures applicable for interconnection negotiations to a major supplier are made publicly available.
8. A service supplier requesting interconnection with a major supplier will have recourse, either: (a) at any time or (b) after a reasonable period of time which has been made publicly known, to the regulatory regime, to resolve disputes regarding appropriate terms, conditions and rates for interconnection within a reasonable period of time.
8.1 The regulatory regime clearly describes dispute resolution mechanisms in advance, in order to create strong incentives for parties to negotiate in good faith.
8.2 The regulatory regime has powers to penalize parties that fail to negotiate in a timely manner and good faith.