Principles:
1. A major supplier has an obligation to provide interconnection at any technically
feasible point in the network.
2. A major supplier has an obligation to provide interconnection under
non-discriminatory and transparent terms, conditions, including technical standards and
specifications.
3. A major supplier has an obligation to provide interconnection at non-discriminatory
rates and of a quality no less favorable than that provided for its own like services or
for like services of non-affiliated service suppliers or for its subsidiaries or other
affiliates.
4. A major supplier has an obligation to provide interconnection in a timely fashion
and to negotiate in good faith. The regulatory regime has dispute resolution mechanisms,
which may include the application of general or sector specific competition law and
associated penalties, if the major supplier delays in fulfilling its obligations.
5. A major supplier has an obligation to provide interconnection at cost-oriented
rates.
5.1 The regulatory regime has processes to increase the transparency of these
cost-oriented rates.
5.2 The reasonableness and the economic feasibility of the cost-oriented rates are
enabled through costing methodologies or other mechanisms through broad consultation of
interested parties.
5.3 A major supplier has an obligation to provide interconnection in a manner
sufficiently unbundled so that another supplier need not pay for network components or
facilities that it does not require for the service to be provided.
5.3.1. The essential ability of competing service operators to enter all segments of
the market requires identifying critical, technically and economically feasible points of
interconnection to the major supplier's network.
5.3.2. The regulatory regime requires provision of access, often from major suppliers,
to key rights of way, such as poles, ducts and conduits, under reasonable terms and
conditions in order to access unbundled elements.
5.4. A major supplier has an obligation to provide interconnection upon request, at
points in addition to the network termination points offered to the majority of other
interconnecting suppliers, subject to charges that reflect the justifiable costs
associated with necessary additional facilities.
6. A major supplier is prevented from anti-competitive practices, such as engaging in
anti-competitive cross-subsidization and anti-competitive subsidization from other
suppliers.
6.1 A major supplier is prevented from anti-competitive practices such as abusing
information obtained from competitors.
6.2. A major supplier is prevented from anti-competitive practices such as not making
available to other services suppliers on a timely basis technical information about
essential facilities and commercially relevant information which are necessary for them to
provide services.
7. It is ensured that either interconnection agreements between a major supplier and
other operators or a reference interconnection offer will be made publicly available.
7.1 . All procedures applicable for interconnection negotiations to a major supplier
are made publicly available.
8. A service supplier requesting interconnection with a major supplier will have
recourse, either: (a) at any time or (b) after a reasonable period of time which has been
made publicly known, to the regulatory regime, to resolve disputes regarding appropriate
terms, conditions and rates for interconnection within a reasonable period of time.
8.1 The regulatory regime clearly describes dispute resolution mechanisms in advance,
in order to create strong incentives for parties to negotiate in good faith.
8.2 The regulatory regime has powers to penalize parties that fail to negotiate in a
timely manner and good faith.